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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the state law breach of contract claim alleged in 
Count One of the Complaint in the instant case is barred by the 
prior final order of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah which dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs1 
federal law claims based upon the same operative facts as those 
set forth in support of Count One, 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was filed on July 
20, 1993, and was published at 217 Utah Adv. Rep. 33. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. The Opinion sought to be reviewed was entered July 20, 
1993. 
B. Plaintiffs' Petition For Rehearing was denied by Order 
entered September 23, 1993. 
C. The Court has sole discretion in granting or denying 
this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2-2(5). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-40 (1953) 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff 
fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, 
his representatives, may commence a new action within one 
year after the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-23(2) (1984) 
Within six years: 
• • • 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability 
founded upon and instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in 
Lower Courts 
This is an action for damages in which Plaintiffs have 
alleged the breach of a written contract which they entered into 
with Defendants on July 17, 1981.1 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint commencing this action on 
June 5, 1990. Upon Defendants1 motion, the District Court 
entered its order dismissing the Complaint on December 31, 1990. 
Plaintiffs timely filed their Notice Of Appeal on January 29, 
1991. 
The Court Of Appeals issued its Opinion affirming the 
District Court's order of dismissal on July 20, 1993. Plaintiffs 
filed a Petition For Rehearing on July 28, 1993. Defendants' 
response to the Petition For Rehearing was filed on September 14, 
1993. Plaintiffs filed a Motion For Leave To File Reply In 
Support Of Petition For Rehearing on September 21, 1993. The 
Court Of Appeals issued orders denying both the Petition For 
Rehearing and the Motion For Leave To File Reply In Support Of 
Petition For Rehearing on September 23, 1993. 
xThe breach of contract at issue in this petition is alleged 
in Count One of the Complaint. 
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(B) Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review 
1. On or about March 14, 1979, Defendant Mervin Borthick, 
acting in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of 
Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, issued an order 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Impairment Order") placing 
certain restrictions upon the operations of Plaintiff Murray 
First Thrift and Loan Company ("MFT&L") on the grounds that MFT&L 
was: 
1. Conducting its business in an unsound and unsafe 
manner; 
2. Pursuing plans which jeopardized the position of its 
thrift holders; 
3. Operating with an impairment of capital; and 
4. Had violated a law applicable to industrial loan 
corporations. 
(R. 00006). 
2. The Impairment Order also recommended certain corrective 
action in order to avoid having "the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions, under authority of Section 7-2-1 Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended, to forthwith take possession of the business 
and property of Murray First Thrift & Loan Co." (R. 00006-7). 
3. At the time of the issuance of the Impairment Order, 
approximately eighty percent (80%) of the stock of MFT&Lfs parent 
corporation, Plaintiff MFT Financial ("MFTF") was owned by MFT 
Holding Company, which in turn was one-hundred percent (100%) 
owned by R. Howard Harmer, Cora Beth Harmer, Franklin Johnson and 
Glendon Johnson. (R. 00008-9). 
4. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs Rodney F. Gordon and 
Jim P. Hansen were controlling shareholders, officers and/or 
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directors of Irving Financial Corporation, (R. 00009). 
5. Motivated in large part by the restrictions imposed upon 
MFT&L under the terms of the Impairment Order, R. Howard Harmer, 
Cora Beth Harmer, and R. Howard Harmer, Trustee for Glendon 
Johnson and Franklin Johnson, as "Sellers", entered into a Stock 
Purchase Agreement dated October 6, 1980, whereby said parties 
agreed to sell their stock in MFT Holding Company to Irving 
Financial Corporation for the purchase price of $16,000,000.00. 
(R. 00009). 
6. On or about December 31, 1980, and pursuant to 
negotiations between Irving Financial Corporation and Borthick 
regarding Irving's contemplated purchase of the stock of MFT 
Holding Company, Borthick issued an Order essentially providing 
for the approval of the proposed purchase and the lifting of the 
Impairment Order on the condition precedent that Irving inject 
certain specified new capital into MFT&L. (R. 00009-10). 
7. Subsequently, on or about July 17, 1981, Irving and 
Borthick entered into an agreement modifying the terms of the 
December 31, 1980, Order, pursuant to which Defendant Department 
of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah ("DFI") agreed to 
lift the Impairment Order on certain conditions, including 
living's contribution to MFT&L of the sum of $1,900,000.00 as 
paid-in capital. (R. 00010). 
8. The agreement was modified again by letter dated July 
30, 1981, to reduce the required sum of paid-in capital to 
$1,800,000.00. (R. 00011). 
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9. Plaintiffs were intended third-party beneficiaries of 
the July 17, 1981, agreement. (R. 00013). 
10. Despite Plaintiffs' substantial compliance with the 
terms of the agreement, Defendants failed and refused to perform 
their end of the bargain. Specifically, on or about July 22, 
1982, and after Plaintiffs had injected approximately 
$11,900,000.00 in new and replacement capital into MFT&L, 
Defendants DF1 and Elaine B. Weis seized the business and 
property of Plaintiffs MFT&L and MFT Mortgage Co., purporting to 
act under authority of Utah Code Ann. Section 7-2-1. (R. 00013). 
11. On January 22, 1987, Plaintiffs filed an action against 
Defendants in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah entitled Harris, et al. v. Weis, et al., civil no. C-87-
0031S (hereinafter referred to as the "Harris" case).2 (R. 
00083); 217 Utah Adv. Rep. 33. 
12. In the Second Amended Complaint filed in Harris, 
Plaintiffs alleged various federal statutory claims3 based upon 
the following factual allegations: 
On or about July 17, 1981, the Defendant State of Utah, 
through its Department of Financial Institutions ... 
proposed an agreement in writing which agreement was 
affirmed and accepted by Plaintiffs Hansen ... and 
Gordon and others. 
2Plainti fs had originally brought their claims against 
Defendants ir the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, civil no. C86-2894, on May 30, 1986. 
That case was dismissed as to Defendants without prejudice on 
venue grounds on November 10, 1986. 
30ne of the plaintiffs in Harris who is not a party to the 
case at bar also alleged a state law claim for defamation. 
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Pursuant to this agreement, Plaintiffs Hansen ... and 
Gordon were to become owners of controlling stock 
interests (not less than 80%) in [MFT&L], MFT 
Financial, MFT Mortgage and MFT Leasing Company by 
investing their personal cash, certain personal assets 
and assets of associates into said companies' capital 
account in an amount of approximately $11,100,000 •.. 
The capital was infused by Plaintiffs ... in the manner 
demanded by defendants. However, on July 22, 1982, ... 
[MFT&L] was seized by the State of Utah and such 
seizure included the capital infused by Plaintiffs ... 
(R. 00355). 
13. On June 5, 1989, the Harris case was dismissed with 
prejudice.4 (R. 00161-62). 
14. Plaintiffs refiled the instant case within one-year of 
the order dismissing Harris in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-12-40. (R. 00002). 
ARGUMENT 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS 
COURT'S DECISIONS IN PENROD V. NU CREATION CREME 
AND FOIL V. BOLLINGER 
The Court of Appeals' based its affirmance of the District 
Court's order dismissing Count One of the Complaint on the fact 
that the Harris court's June 5, 1989, order 
"specifically states that 'all claims in the Amended 
Complaint, together with the corresponding claims of 
the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed with 
prejudice.' Every cause of action in Harris was 
dismissed on the merits." 
4The June 5, 1989, order originally indicated that "all 
claims in the Amended Complaint, together with the corresponding 
claims of the Second Amended Complaint [were] dismissed with 
prejudice." (R. 00161-62). However, by order dated July 20, 
1990, the Harris court granted Plaintiffs relief under Rule 
60(b), F.R.C.P., revising the June 5, 1989, order to reflect that 
dismissal of the only state law claim alleged in the Second 
Amended Complaint was on jurisdictional grounds and was without 
prejudice. (R. 00260). 
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217 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34. 
Because all of Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on the 
merits by the Harris court, the Court of Appeals held that 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to rely on the one-year savings 
provision of Section 78-12-40, U.C.A., as authority for the 
refiling of Count One of the instant action. 217 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 34. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court of Appeals1 
holding is in conflict with this Court's decisions in Penrod v. 
Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983), and Foil v. 
Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
As in the case at bar, in Penrod, the plaintiffs had filed 
their first action in federal court. The federal action asserted 
a claim under the Federal Trade Commission Act, as well as four 
state common law fraud claims. Also as in the case at bar, the 
federal court dismissed the federal claim with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted, 
while the state law fraud claims were dismissed without prejudice 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Thereafter, the Penrod plaintiffs refiled their action in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. In their 
state court action, the plaintiffs again alleged the same state 
law fraud claims previously alleged in their federal action. 
Additionally, they asserted a new state law claim of negligent 
misrepresentation based upon the "same operative facts" as their 
prior Federal Trade Commission Act claim which had been dismissed 
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with prejudice by the federal court. The Third District Court 
dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claim on the ground 
that it was barred by the prior with prejudice dismissal of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act claim which had been based upon the 
"same operative facts". 
This Court identified the issue for determination on appeal 
as follows: 
Since the second claim for relief alleges a different 
legal theory for recovery than the claim whose merits 
were ruled upon by the federal court, the issue is 
whether the federal district court adjudication acts to 
bar that claim in this case even though the federal 
court did not rule on the merits of the common law 
claim of negligent misrepresentation. 
669 P.2d at 875. 
This Court ruled that the negligent misrepresentation claim 
was not barred by the prior with prejudice dismissal of the 
federal claim based upon the "same operative facts" because the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' Federal Trade Commission Act claim 
left the federal court without subject matter jurisdiction over 
any state law claims and, therefore, the negligent 
misrepresentation claim could not have been litigated in federal 
court. 
In short, the plaintiffs did not litigate, and could 
not have litigated, their second cause of action in the 
federal court because that court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
669 P.2d at 877. 
As applied to the case at bar, the Penrod ruling means that 
the Harris court's with prejudice dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
federal claims does not operate to bar the state law breach of 
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contract claim alleged in Count One even though the two claims 
are base upon the "same operative facts". 
There is, of course, an obvious distinction between Penrod 
and the case at bar. The issue in Penrod was whether the 
subsequently asserted state law claim was barred by res judicata. 
The issue in the case at bar, on the other hand, is whether the 
dismissal of Plaintiffs1 federal claims "on the merits" bars 
Plaintiffs from relying on the one-year saving provision of 
Section 78-12-40, U.C.A., as authority for pursuing an action for 
the breach of a written contract despite the expiration of the 
six-year period of limitations set forth in Section 78-12-23, 
U.C.A. 
Plaintiffs submit that the distinction is not material. In 
Foil v. Bollinger, supra, this Court held that 
The tolling statute [i.e., U.C.A. Section 78-12-40] 
requires only that the claim or claims for relief 
stated in the second action arise out of the 
transaction or occurrence on which the claim or claims 
in the first action were founded. 
601 P.2d at 144 (emphasis added). 
It is beyond credible dispute that the claim asserted in 
Count One of the Complaint in the case at bar arises out of 
precisely the same "transaction or occurrence" as that upon which 
the federal claims alleged in Harris were founded. 
Accordingly, because the Harris court lacked jurisdiction to 
address the merits of Plaintiffs1 state law claims and because 
the breach of contract claim asserted in Count One is based upon 
the same "transaction or occurrence" as the federal claims 
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asserted in Harris, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they were 
entitled to rely on the one-year period set forth in Section 78-
12-40 in which to file Count One of the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs submit that the Court 
of Appeals1 Opinion, insofar as it affirms the District Court's 
order dismissing Count One of the Complaint, is in conflict with 
this Court's decisions in Penrod and Foil, supra. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs respectfully petition the Court for a Writ Of 
Certiorari with respec£ thereto. 
DATED this ^f day of October, 1993, 
Scq^t^B. T^ litchell 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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APPENDIX 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Plaintiffs appeal from the final order of the district 
court, entered November 15, 1991, granting defendants' motion to 
dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm. 
FACTS 
In March 1979, defendant Mervin Borthick, acting in his 
capacity as the Commissioner of the Department of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah (DFI), issued an order placing 
certain restrictions upon the operation of plaintiff Murray First 
Thrift & Loan (MFT&L). Coincident with this order, Borthick 
recommended that certain "corrective actions" be taken in order 
for MFT&L to avoid having the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions take possession of MFT&L under Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-
1 (1988). 
At the time of Borthick's order, eighty percent of the stock 
in MFT&L was owned by the Reading Holding Company. The owners of 
the holding company entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement in 
October 1980, agreeing to sell their stock to Irving Financial 
Corporation (Irving), owned by plaintiffs Rodney Gordon and Jim 
Hansen. Plaintiffs allege that Borthick, as DFI Commissioner, 
entered into a related reorganization agreement with Irving, 
promising to lift the restrictions placed on MFT&L upon 
compliance with certain conditions. Plaintiffs claim that 
despite their substantial compliance with the reorganization 
agreement,-DFI, under authority of its new commissioner, Elaine 
Weis, seized the business and property of MFT&L and its parent 
company, Murray First Thrift Mortgage Company (MFT), on July 22, 
1982. 
On December 13, 1932, MFT&L and MFT entered into a Purchase 
and Assumption Agreement (P & A Agreement), under which a 
majority of MFT&L's assets were transferred to First Security 
Financial and the remainder were retained by DFI, whose 
commissioner was then George Sutton. Under the agreement, DFI 
was to terminate control over the retained assets within six 
months or at the earliest possible time, consistent with 
defendant Sutton's statutory responsibilities. As part of the 
agreement, DFI agreed not to impede any sale or development of 
the retained assets by MFT&L. Despite MFT&L's repeated demands, 
DFI retained control over certain assets for several years, and 
sold some of the assets while MFT&L itself was negotiating for 
their sale. 
On May 30, 1986, plaintiffs in the present suit filed an 
action in federal court (the Nelson case) against the same 
defendants in the present suit and others. The Nelson case was 
originally dismissed on venue grounds. On January 22, 1987, the 
action was refiled in the proper venue (the Harris case). On 
June 6, 1989, a judgment was entered in Harris dismissing the 
case with prejudice. 
On June 5, 1990, plaintiffs filed the present case alleging 
breach of contract by DFI, Weis, and Borthick1 for failing to 
abide by the reorganization agreement (count I), and breach of 
contract by DFI, Sutton, and the Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation of Utah (ILGC) for breaching the P & A Agreement 
(count II). The trial court granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss the complaint. 
1. We note that Borthick was never served individually or in his 
capacity as DFI Commissioner. 
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ISSUES 
The issue in this case is whether the causes of action 
alleged in counts I and II were properly dismissed because they 
were barred by statutes of limitations. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), 
an appellate court must accept the material allegations of the 
complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling should be 
affirmed only if it clearly appears the complainant can prove no 
set of facts in support of his or her claims, Anderson v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992). 
Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of 
law, "we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it 
under a correctness standard." Id. (quoting St. Benedict's Dev. 
Co. v. St. Benedict's HOSP., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). A 
trial court's determination that a statute of limitations has 
expired is also a question of law which we review for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the lower court's 
determination. Gramlich v. Munsev, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 
1992). 
Count I 
In count I, the individual and corporate plaintiffs allege a 
breach of the reorganization agreement by defendants Borthick, 
Weis, and DFI for their seizure of MFT&L and MFT on July 22, 
1982. The alleged breach occurred nearly eight years before the 
filing of the present lawsuit. Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code 
places a six year limitation on the time in which "[a]n action 
upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing" may be brought. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 
(1992). 
Plaintiffs argue they are not time-barred by section 78-12-
23 because the Utah Code provides the following savings statute: 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and . . . if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff . . . 
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may commence a new action within one year 
after the . . . failure. 
Utah Code Ann- § 78-12-40 (1992). 
Plaintiffs argue the cause of action alleged in count I of 
the present case arose out of the same transaction or occurrence 
that prompted the filing of the Harris case. They argue that 
Harris was commenced within the statutory time period and it 
failed for reasons other than on the merits. Thus, they conclude 
count I of the present case is timely because it was commenced 
within one year after the failure. We disagree. 
Harris was commenced within the statutory time period, 
however, the final judgment, entered June 6, 1989, specifically 
states that "all claims in the Amended Complaint, together with 
the corresponding claims of the Second Amended Complaint are 
dismissed with prejudice."2 Every cause of action in Harris was 
dismissed on the merits. Plaintiffs argue that the attempted 
third amended complaint, which alleged a cause of action similar 
to count I of the present case, failed on grounds other than the 
merits. The third amended complaint, however, was stricken and 
was not part of the Harris action.3 The Harris court found that 
2. Additionally, in the court's ruling and order of September 
30, 1988, the court "dismissed on the merits and with prejudice" 
all the claims of the amended complaint and all the claims of the 
second amended complaint except for one claim of defamation, and 
one claim of civil rights violation by a public official. 
3. The third amended complaint was stricken because the 
plaintiff filed it without leave of court. Amended complaints 
filed without leave of court are "without legal effect and will 
not be considered." Baxter v. Strickland, 381 F. Supp. 487, 491 
n.4 (ND Ga 1974). It is important to note the distinction 
between cause of action that is dismissed, and an amended 
complaint that is stricken. The first had a legal "life." The 
second never did. Although there is no Utah case directly on 
point, courts in other jurisdictions have treated stricken 
amended complaints as non-existent with respect to tolling a 
statute of limitations and reviewing the proposed amendment on 
appeal. See McGinnis v. A.R. Abrams. Inc., 490 N.E.2d 115, 117 
111. Ct. App. 1986) (unauthorized amendments were considered 
nullities and did not satisfy nor toll statute of limitations); 
Midwest Bank & Trust v. Village of Lakewood, 447 N.E.2d 1358, 
1362 (111. Ct. App. 1983) ("An amendment to a pleading which is 
filed without leave of court to do so may be stricken and must be 
disregarded on review."); People v. Alarcon, 324 P.2d 58, 59 
(order striking pleading is not ordinarily appealable). 
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"the third amended complaint is not properly before the court and 
will not be considered." The attempted third amended complaint 
never rose to the level of a cause of action. Accordingly, the 
third amended complaint was not a "cause of action" within an 
action "commenced within due time" as required by the savings 
statute. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed count I as 
being untimely filed. 
Count II 
In count II, the corporate plaintiffs MFT&L and MFT, allege 
defendants Sutton, DFI, and ILGC* breached the P & A Agreement 
by retaining assets longer than the agreed upon six months, and 
by ultimately selling some of the assets. Plaintiffs argue that 
the breach occurred when the retained assets were sold in 1987. 
They argue that the present suit was brought within the six year 
statutory period for contract causes of action. We disagree. 
The defendants breached the contract when the assets were 
retained longer than contractually agreed upon. This event 
created a cause of action. Section 16-10-100 of the Utah Code 
places a two year limitation on the time in which a dissolved 
corporation can bring a claim for a predissolution cause of 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1991). The corporate 
plaintiffs were dissolved on December 31, 1984. The six-month 
period agreed upon by the plaintiffs and defendants for returning 
the assets ended on June 13, 1983, making the breach of the P & A 
Agreement a predissolution cause of action. As already noted, 
the present case was filed in 1990, more than five years after 
the dissolution. 
The savings statute does not prevent count II from being 
time-barred. The Nelson case, which arguably contained the same 
cause of action as that brought by the corporate plaintiffs in 
count II,. was filed within the two year statutory period. The 
cause of action brought in Nelson failed on grounds other than 
the merits on November 10, 1986. However, the failure occurred 
before the two-year statutory limitation had expired, preventing 
the invocation of the savings statute. An additional order was 
entered in Nelson on July 15, 1988, after the expiration of the 
two-year statutory limit. This additional order still does not 
help the corporate plaintiffs because this order dismissed all 
the defendants on the merits. Finally, even if Nelson was 
brought within the statutory limitation and failed on July 15, 
1988, on grounds other than the merits, count II of the present 
4. The claims against Sutton and ILGC were resolved pursuant to 
a stipulation agreement. 
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case was brought well after the one year extension granted by the 
savings statute. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the cause 
of action alleged in count II by the corporate plaintiffs as 
untimely. Because both counts were barred by statutes of 
limitation, we do not reach the other issues raised by the 
plaintiffs... 
CONCLUSION 
We see no set of facts that can support plaintiffs claims. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that the plaintiffs' 
cause of action in counts I and II of the present case were 
barred by statutes of limitation. 
Norman H. Jackson, *dudge 
WE CONCUR: 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Jim Pratt Hansen, 
et al. , 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Department of Financial 
Institutions, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 3 1993 
J / - Mary T. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 920686-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Garff. 
This matter is before the Court upon a petition for 
rehearing filed by appellants. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this 23rd day of September, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
I dissent. 
